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1 Introduction
Transboundary environmental externalities, including global externalities such as green-
house gas emissions, have recently received much attention in international negotiations
on environmental protection as well as in the environmental economics literature. Apart
from various barriers that often frustrate environmental policymaking in general, addi-
tional impediments to the effective and efficient regulation of transboundary external-
ities are the partly public character of the `bad' in question, and the resulting incentives
for individual countries to free ride on other countries' achievements (Carraro, 1997).
This is even more serious because of the potentially far-reaching, global consequences
of excessive levels of these emissions in case of insufficiently stringent policies.
Apart from free-riding problems for transboundary externalities (see, for instance,
Markusen, 1975a), there are additional factors that complicate the design of environ-
mental policies when the international dimension is considered explicitly. One important
matter concerns the potential negative effects of local environmental policies on the
international competitiveness, and hence the profitability, of local producers. The
relations between competitiveness, trade, and environment, and therefore also between
trade policies and environmental policies, have consequently received growing atten-
tion in the literature [see, for instance, Jaffe et al (1995) for an assessment of empirical
evidence, van Beers and van den Bergh (1996) and Ulph (1997) for general surveys,
Krutilla (1999) for a survey on partial equilibrium models, and Steininger (1999) for a
discussion of general equilibrium models]. To complicate matters further, trade usually
requires transportation, which in itself can also give rise to emissions affecting the
global environment. At the same time, trade often indirectly affects foreign production
and hence emission levels. Consequently, a country should not ignore the derived
environmental effects of local policies, such as the induced impacts on international
transportation flows as well as on foreign production in addition to the direct impact
on local production and emission levels. Various types of interaction that will simulta-
neously affect different countries' behavior in terms of environmental policies can thus
be distinguished when considering the international dimension.
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In this paper we aim to offer a framework in which these interactions can be
studied simultaneously. The central question concerns the first-best and second-best
tax rules for open economies concerned with a transboundary environmental exter-
nality, and the relative efficiency of various policy alternatives, taking account of
spatioeconomic interdependencies between economies. The analysis explicitly pays
attention to: (1) the partly public character of transboundary environmental external-
ities; (2) the relation between trade policies, transport policies, and environmental
policies through their joint impacts on various elements making up a region's social
surplus (producer surplus, consumer surplus, environmental quality, and tax incomes);
(3) the possibility of countries or regions behaving in a noncooperative manner;
(4) the role of emissions caused by transport in evaluating environmental policies
from a spatial perspective; and (5) the use of consumption taxes, production taxes,
or the combination of these two in a multiregion context. Given these features, the
model setting is, for instance, applicable to the case of regional or national envi-
ronmental policies for the regulation of transboundary emissions from energy use in
an international context.
The analysis is based on the spatial price equilibrium (SPE) methodology, and
can therefore be characterized as a partial equilibrium model [see van Beers and
van den Bergh (1996) for a discussion on the use of partial versus general equilibrium
models in this context]. Among the growing number of contributions in this field,
ours is probably most closely related to Krutilla (1991); we also present a partial
equilibrium model allowing for the simultaneous consideration of terms-of-trade
and environmental effects of tax policies for a competitive sector, and we ignore
the effects of local environmental policies on firm relocation (see, for instance,
Markusen et al, 1993) or on the spatial diffusion of environmental technologies
(Ulph, 1996b). The analysis is nevertheless quite different from the one in Krutilla
(1991) because of the explicit consideration of the simultaneous behavior of two
regions, so that the benefits of policy coordination can be considered explicitly
[Krutilla (1991) focuses on one single open economy]; by including transport and
transport emissions in the analysis; by considering a transboundary externality, so
that induced effects on emissions by transport and by the `foreign' suppliers also
affect the efficiency of environmental policies; and by explicitly considering produc-
tion taxes, consumption taxes, and their combination for the regulation of production
induced externalities.
Without claiming to offer an exhaustive overview, we would like briefly to mention
some more related studies. Some studies which explicitly focus on the market power of
producers and the strategic behavior of producers and/or governmentsötypically
using game-theoretic approachesöare Barret (1994), Conrad (1993), Kennedy (1994),
Markusen (1975b), Rauscher (1994), and Ulph (1996a; 1996b). Some recent studies
based on general equilibrium approaches are Copeland (1994), Frederiksson (1997),
Markusen et al (1993), and Rauscher (1994). To the best of our knowledge, the present
setting (in which a partial equilibrium analysis is given of a situation where emissions
from local and foreign production as well as from trade-induced transport affect
local welfare) has no precedent in the literature, and further extends earlier partial
equilibrium studies by considering the simultaneous effects on overall spatial efficiency
of second-best taxes used by different interacting regions.
The use of a partial equilibrium approach without a trade balance expression in a
model with trade of course presupposes that factor income effects are not of interest
and that trade imbalances on a sectoral level may persist over the relevant planning
period. Krutilla (1999) observes in this respect that:
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‘‘In the trade-and-environment context, partial equilibrium models are particularly
useful for studying the consequences of terms-of-trade effects, and for indicating how
such factors as a country's commodity trade balance, and the type of externality
problem, affect the normative properties of environmental policy actions'' (page 404).
These are exactly the type of questions addressed in this paper.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we start with a presentation of the
general model and in section 3 we present general analytical solutions for the first-best
and second-best (`spatially noncooperative') policies. In section 4, we discuss the over-
all system effects of such noncooperative policies and finally, in section 5 we offer some
concluding remarks.
2 The spatial model of the firms, the markets, and the externalities
It is clear that, when studying a topic as broad as that sketched in the previous section,
a large variety of modelling approaches can be followed [see van Beers and van den
Bergh (1996) for an overview]. A clear trade-off, for instance, exists between the level of
generality of the model, and the extent to which it is capable of producing tractable
analytical results. Our aim is to keep the model as general as possible, but to econo-
mize on complexity wherever this does not seem overly restrictive, so that interpretable
analytical results can still be obtained.
For that reason, we confine ourselves in the first place to a setting with only two
independent regionsöfor example, countries. Furthermore, because of the relative
complexity of the issue at hand, any other market or government failures (apart from
the public environmental externality) and failures to coordinate policies optimally, are
assumed to be nonexistent. This ensures that additional second-best distortions result-
ing from, for instance, the market power of firms or consumers, inefficient labor
markets, dynamics and uncertainty, or imperfect information will not affect the analyses
to follow. Although we recognize that such other market failures may undoubtedly play
an important role in reality, we leave their treatment in the current context to future
research, and wish to concentrate solely on the economic principles underlying the
efficiency and effectiveness of various types of environmental regulation of a global
externality in an otherwise `first-best' spatial world.
Finally, as many `other things' as possible are held constant, for the same reason. For
instance, the technologies usedöincluding abatement technologiesöare assumed to be
fixed; although we intend to consider endogenous technologies in our model in the near
future [a nonspatial version of the type of model we plan to use can be found in Verhoef
and Nijkamp (1997)]. Emission coefficients are therefore fixed, and a tax on production
can in principle be as efficient as a tax on polluting inputs, for example energy, and as
a tax on emissions, for instance CO2. Therefore, policy-induced technological progress
is ignored in our model.
Firms are assumed to be profit maximizing price-takers on both the output and
the input markets. Firms are assumed to be identical within a region, but may be
different between regions. We have emphasized the importance of considering hetero-
geneity of firms in evaluating environmental policies elsewhere (1997; 1999); in this
model, such heterogeneity would be caused by spatial factors. The assumption of
identical price-taking firms within a region allows a simple derivation of regional supply
functions and locally optimal environmental policies [Verhoef and Nijkamp (1999) discuss
complications that arise with heterogeneity of firms within a single closed economy].
One homogeneous good is considered, which is produced and consumed in both
regions, which are labeled A and B. It is assumed that the production of the good in
either region, as well as transport between the regions, gives rise to environmental
emissions that affect welfare in both regions.The externality is therefore public in nature.
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The case of a purely public externalityöwhere the extent to which welfare in a region
is affected depends on the unweighted sum of all emissionsöis a limiting case of the
present specification. When the externality is not purely public, heavier weights for
local emissions reflect localized externalities. The average and marginal emissions of
production may vary between the regions, and the regional valuation of the total
emissions may also vary.
For the modeling of the spatial market, we will use the SPE approach, which was
first presented in a seminal paper by Samuelson (1952) and, later on, extensively
studied and further developed by Takayama and others (see Labys and Yang, 1997;
Takayama and Judge, 1971; Takayama and Labys, 1986). The SPE framework has
already been proved to be a useful tool in investigating environmental policies in
spatial systems in earlier papers which focused primarily on transport (Verhoef and
van den Bergh, 1996; Verhoef et al, 1997). Krutilla (1989) used an SPE setting when
analyzing a different type of market failure in a comparable context, namely market
power by the transportation sector.
The two regions themselves are modeled as spaceless nodes, in the sense that trade
within a region requires no transport (or at least, this transport can safely be
ignored).(1) Trade between the regions, however, does require transport. Transport
services are assumed to be offered by `footloose outside transport suppliers', who reside
in neither region A nor region B. Average and marginal transport costs per unit of
good traded are constant and given by t (there is no congestion); and, apart from its
environmental externality, transport is efficiently costed at price t. Hence, the transport
supplier(s) make zero profits, so that their footloose status does not lead to a `welfare
surplus leak' in the model.
Figure 1 [taken from Verhoef et al (1997)] gives a diagrammatic representation of
SPE. The left-hand panel shows the local inverse demand and industry supply curves
DA (YA ) and SA (QA ) for the good in region A (note that figure 1 is a back-to-back
diagram, so that YA and QA increase when moving leftwards from the origin). In
autarky (denoted by superscripts a), equilibrium arises with a production and con-
sumption level Q aA  Y aA , and a local price P aA . The right-hand panel shows the same
for region B, where the autarky equilibrium is given by Y aB, Q
a
B , and P
a
B .
Now suppose that the per-unit-of-good transport cost between the two regions
equals t, which is smaller than the autarky price difference. It is then profitable and
efficient to transport some goods from the lower to the higher price region. In figure 1,
we assume that P aA ÿ P aB > t > 0. To determine the after-trade equilibrium for both
regions (denoted by superscripts T), an excess demand/supply curve, X(T ) is con-
structed by horizontal subtraction of the industry supply curve from the demand curve.
For each after-trade local price PTA > P
a
A , P
T
A  XA thus implies the net export TA that
region A would supply to B. For PTA < P
a
A, negative values of TA imply positive net
imports. A comparable curve is also shown for region B [labeled XB (TB )].
The after-trade equilibrium in a closed system is then given by TA  ÿTB
and jPTA ÿ PTB j  t. From figure 1, it can be seen that PTA ÿ PTB  t and that
QTB ÿYTB  TB  ÿTA  YTA ÿQTA ; therefore region B is the net exporter. By observing
that DR and SR give the marginal benefits of consumption and the marginal costs of
production in region R, respectively, the two shaded areas can be identified as the net
benefits of trade and transport. Both regions gain, as they should with voluntary trade.
Moreover, assuming price-taking behavior and ignoring the environmental externality,
(1) That is to say, private and environmental costs of intraregional transport are not considered
explicitly, but can be assumed to be included in those of local production, in which case the costs
of transport for trade would actually reflect those owing to the additional kilometers driven for
interregional trade compared with intraregional trade.
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the after-trade equilibrium is Pareto efficient.(2) However, in region A the consumers
benefit and the producers lose, whereas the opposite occurs in region B.
Evidently, as soon as environmental externalities enter the picture, the unregulated
spatial market is unlikely to produce a Pareto-optimal outcome. For the evaluation of
various policy alternatives in that case, the formal model consistent with figure 1 has
to be solved. For this purpose we define the following additional variables: ZO D is the
net delivery from region O (origin) to D (destination); T  jTA j  jTB j is the total
level of transport; ER (QA ,QB ,T ) denotes the valuation of the total emissions by region
R; and tPR and tCR give local production and consumption taxes, respectively, in
region R.
Note that neither import/export tariffs nor taxes on transportöwhich are actually
indistinguishable in the present model with constant technologiesöwill be considered.
There are a number of reasons for this. First, these were already considered in Verhoef
and van de Bergh (1996) and Verhoef et al (1997), where the attention was focused
explicitly on transport, and on second-best transportation taxes. Second, with local
production and consumption taxes present, the model would actually have an excessive
number of regulatory taxes if local transportation taxes were also allowed. No unique
solutions for the three tax expressions could then be derived. Therefore, the implicit
transportation taxes or tariffs in the present case can be found as the difference
between local production and local consumption taxes. Third, we wish to place con-
sumption taxes in the spotlight. Such an instrument may have the advantage that
the international competitiveness of local firms is not affected as strongly as in the
case of taxes on production, because the relative terms of competition between local
and domestic suppliers remain equal both on the local market and on the foreign
market. In contrast, the local producer would suffer a comparative disadvantage
on both markets from an environmental tax on production. Because the effects on
,
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Figure 1. A graphical representation of the spatial price equilibrium model.
(2) This can be verified by solving the total social welfare problem (for both regions jointly), as given
in equation (3) below, for the case where the valuation of emissions is zero. All regulatory taxes
then become equal to zero; see equations (4a) ^ (4d).
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international competitiveness are often put forward as an important objection
against producer-oriented taxes, the consumption tax may in some cases offer an
attractive alternative, and therefore certainly deserves attention.
Continuing with the definition of variables, dAB is a dummy variable that takes
on the value of 1 if ZAB > 0, and 0 otherwise. Likewise, dBA  1 (dAA  1, dBB  1)
if ZBA > 0 (ZAA > 0,ZBB > 0), and 0 otherwise. Observe that in the SPE model,
dAB  dBA 4 1, cross-hauling does not occur in the standard SPE model (see also
Labys and Yang, 1997). This may seem a weakness, in particular since cross-hauling
often seems to occur in realityöat least if the definition of a `homogeneous good' is
taken to include a sufficiently large number of product variants and brands. However,
under the standard `benchmark' assumptions of a completely homogeneous good and
perfect information, cross-hauling cannot be consistent with utility and profit-max-
imizing behavior. Nevertheless, the consideration of heterogeneous products, possibly
close substitutes, offers an interesting question for follow-up research. In particular, it
would be interesting to see how such cross-elasticities would affect the second-best tax
rules to be presented below.
Throughout the paper, it is assumed that all relevant functions are differentiable,
that marginal benefits are nonincreasing in consumption, that marginal costs as well
as marginal emissions are nondecreasing in production, and that the marginal valuation
of total emissions is nondecreasing in the total level of emissions.
Throughout the paper, we define social welfare in region R as the social surplus;
here, the sum of the Marshallian consumers' surplus (total benefits minus expenditures)
plus the producers' surplus (total revenues minus total costs) plus the tax revenues
minus the value of the environmental effect:
WR 
 YR
0
DR yR dyR ÿDR YR YR  tCRYR ÿ
 QR
0
SR qR dqR  SR QR QR
 tPRQR ÿ ER QA ; QB ; T  . (1)
The following equalities and inequalities will hold in any decentralized market equili-
brium (with or without taxesöeach t could, of course, be equal to zero):
YA  ZAA  ZBA ; (2a)
YB  ZAB  ZBB ; (2b)
QA  ZAA  ZAB ; (2c)
QB  ZBA  ZBB ; (2d)
ZAA 5 0; SA  tPA  tCA ÿDA 5 0; ZAA SA  tPA  tCAÿDA   0 ; (2e)
ZAB 5 0; SA  tPA  t tCBÿDB 5 0; ZAB SA  tPA  t tCBÿDB   0 ; (2f)
ZBA 5 0; SB  tPB  t tCAÿDA 5 0; ZBA SB  tPB t tCAÿDA   0 ; (2g)
ZBB 5 0; SB  tPB  tCBÿDB 5 0; ZBB SB  tPB  tCBÿDB   0 . (2h)
Equations (2a) ^ (2h) give a straightforward description of a decentralized equilibrium
with price-takers, where all markets clear and where positive deliveries imply that the
marginal benefits must be equal to the marginal cost.
This completes the discussion of the general model. In the next section, the policy
rules are derived under various circumstances.
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3 First-best and the second-best taxes
In this section, we provide the analytical solutions to the model outlined above for
first-best and second-best production and consumption taxes. In section 3.1 we present
the intuitive result that to obtain the first-best spatioeconomic configuration, Pigouvian
taxes should apply throughout. In the subsequent sections we provide the solutions for
various second-best situations, which have in common that the two regions do not
coordinate their policies, but instead set taxes so as to optimize regional welfare only
In section 3.2 we consider uncoordinated second-best taxes for a region using both a
production and a consumption tax. In sections 3.3 and 3.4 we subsequently consider
the use of a production tax and a consumption tax in isolation.
3.1 First-best taxes
First we consider the solution to the problem of maximizing total welfare in the two
economies considered. This gives us the Pareto-efficient configuration, and the first-
best taxes that would apply if either a supraregional regulator could control the entire
system, or if the two regions could coordinate their policies optimally. The solution can
be found by maximizing total welfare for both regions as given in equation (1), subject
to constraints posed by individual optimizing behavior as given by equations (2e) ^ (2h),
under the assumption that the regulator can use all possible taxes, and therefore is
not constrained to use imperfect second-best taxes. Using the dummy variables d
introduced above, we can write the associated Lagrangian as:
L 
 YA
0
DA yA dyA ÿDA YA YA  tCAYA ÿ
 QA
0
SA qA dqA  SA QA QA
 tPAQA ÿ EA QA ; QB ; T  
 YB
0
DB yB dyB ÿDB YB YB  tCBYB
ÿ
 QB
0
SB qB dqB  SB QB QB  tPBQB ÿ EB QA ; QB ; T 
 dAA lAA SA QA   tPA  tCA ÿDA YA 
 dAB lAB SA QA   tPA  t tCB ÿDB YB 
 dBA lBA SB QB   tPB  t tCA ÿDA YA 
 dBB lBB SB QB   tPB  tCB ÿDB YB  . (3)
The specification in equation (3) reveals that the structure of the optimization
problem depends on the exact trade regime that applies (that is, the questions of
whether the various deliveries Zi j are either zero or positive), and hence that different
first-order conditions will apply depending on the prevailing trade regime. The
problem could be written in a Kuhn ^ Tucker form to capture these complications,
but for the present purposeöwhere we wish to present optimal tax rules for each
trade regimeöthis is not necessary. Moreover, we want to avoid complications
due to nonnegativity restrictions on Kuhn ^ Tucker multipliers (see also Verhoef and
van den Bergh, 1996).
The Lagrangian equation (3) can be solved by taking partial derivatives with
respect to the variables Z, by using equations (2a) ^ (2d), t, and l. The first-order
conditions are not presented for reasons of space; they are analogous to those for the
Lagrangian in equation (5) below, the main two differences being that, in this case,
four taxes instead of two can be set optimally, and that the global instead of the regional
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marginal valuation of externalities should be considered. The following first-best taxes
can then be derived:
tCA  tPA 
qEA
qQA
 qEB
qQA
; (4a)
tPA  tCB 
qEA
qQA
 qEB
qQA
 qEA
qT
 qEB
qT
; (4b)
tCA  tPB 
qEA
qQB
 qEB
qQB
 qEA
qT
 qEB
qT
; (4c)
tCB  tPB 
qEA
qQB
 qEB
qQB
. (4d)
Equations (4a) ^ (4d) show that each delivery, intraregional or interregional,
should be taxed at a rate equal to the marginal external cost associated with that
particular type of delivery, which is the standard Pigouvian tax. Note that each tax is
defined as the sum of a tax on the producers and a tax on the consumers involved.
Because, at most, three equations from the set (4a) ^ (4d) apply simultaneously,
whereas four taxes are available, there is always at least one redundant tax. There-
fore, the four taxes can always be set such that the relevant conditions among
equations (4a) ^ (4d) are satisfied.
3.2 Second-best taxes (I): optimizing regional welfare using both production and consumption
taxes
The policy rules derived above will result in a Pareto-efficient spatioeconomic con-
figuration where the joint welfare of the two regions is maximized. Hence, if the
regions fully cooperated by optimally coordinating their policies and sharing tax
revenues according to rules such that both regions gain from marginal total (for both
regions) welfare improvements, then tax rules according to equations (4a) ^ (4d) would
apply. Note also that `partial' welfare losses due to optimal taxation, in terms of
reduced consumers' or producers' surpluses in either region, compared with any other
feasible configuration, could be more than compensated for. This follows from the
tautological observation that first-best taxes lead to a maximization of total welfare.
Nevertheless, regulatory taxes as given in equations (4a) ^ (4d) do not normally
constitute a Nash equilibrium. In particular, there will often be incentives for a
regional government to deviate from the tax rules implied by these equations. In this
subsection, we will investigate this matter by deriving the tax rules to be adopted by a
regional government that is solely concerned with local regional welfare when setting
consumption and production taxes. Such a regulator fully ignores welfare in the other
region, and thus may even e`xploit' foreign consumers or producers whenever this
would improve the welfare in the home region.
In the absence of policy coordination, we assume that both regions' governments
follow a Nash strategy. The `game' is defined such that both governments set the taxes
they control so as to maximize local surplus, treating the tax levels in the other region
parametrically (as given), and taking into account that all producers and consumers
exhibit price-taking behavior that leads to the spatial price equilibrium as described in
equations (2a) ^ (2h).
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Let us consider the relevant maximization problem for the regulator in region A.
The associated Lagrangian can be written as:
L 
 YA
0
DA yA dyA ÿDA YA YA  tCAYA ÿ
 QA
0
SA qA dqA  SA QA QA
 tPAQA ÿ EA QA ; QB ; T   dAAlAA SA QA   tPA  tCA ÿDA YA 
 dAB lAB SA QA   tPA  t tCB ÿDB YB 
dBA lBA SB QB   tPB  t tCA ÿDA YA 
 dBB lBB SB QB   tPB  tCB ÿDB YB  . (5)
The following first-order conditions can now be derived (primes denote derivatives
for functions in one single argument, in particular the demand and supply functions):
qL
qZAA
 ÿD 0AYA  tCA  S 0AQA  tPA ÿ
qEA
qQA
 dAAlAA S 0A ÿD 0A   dABlABS 0A ÿ dBAlBAD 0A  0 ; (6)
qL
qZAB
 S 0AQA  tPA ÿ
qEA
qQA
ÿ qEA
qT
 dAAlAAS 0A  dABlAB S 0A ÿD 0B  ÿ dBB lBBD 0B  0 ; (7a)
qL
qZBA
 ÿD 0AYA  tCA ÿ
qEA
qQB
ÿ qEA
qT
ÿ dAAlAAD 0A  dBA lBA S 0B ÿD 0A   dBB lBBS 0B  0 ; (7b)
qL
qZBB
 ÿ qEA
qQB
ÿ dABlABD 0B  dBA lBAS 0B  dBB lBB S 0B ÿD 0B   0 ; (8)
qL
qtCA
 YA  dAAlAA  dBA lBA  0 ; (9)
qL
qtPA
 QA  dAAlAA  dABlAB  0 ; (10)
qL
qlAA
 dAA SA  tPA  tCA ÿDA   0 ; (11)
qL
qlAB
 dAB SA  tPA  t tCB ÿDB   0 ; (12a)
qL
qlBA
 dBA SB  tPB  t tCA ÿDA   0 ; (12b)
qL
qlBB
 dBB SB  tPB  tCB ÿDB   0 . (13)
Because of the absence of cross-hauling, at most either one of the equations (7a)
and (7b) will apply, and equations (6) and (8) only apply if ZAA > 0 and ZBB > 0.
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However, in order to restrict the number of cases to be considered, it will be assumed
from now on that ZAA > 0 and ZBB > 0, and hence that dAA  1 and dBB  1.
Second-best tax rules for the more restrictive cases where either of the two regions
lacks operative producers or consumers can be derived in a similar manner as the tax
rules to be derived below, and can be expected to be straightforward variations on
these rules, with terms relating to the absent consumers or producers either removed
or amended in an appropriate way.
Under the assumption that dAA  1 and dBB  1, three trade regimes remain
to be considered: A is a net exporter (regime I: dAB  1 and dBA  0); A is a net
importer (II: dAB  0 and dBA  1); and the no-trade regime (III: dAB  dBA  0).
The second-best taxes for these three regimes are presented below. Note that the
inefficiency owing to the public nature of the externality is already reflected in equa-
tions (6) ^ (8) by the absence of terms related to EB ; the regulator in region A is,
without policy coordination, not concerned with the environmental effects in region B.
3.2.1 Region A is a net exporter
In case I, equations (7b) and (12b) become irrelevant. The remaining equations can
then be solved for the following second-best optimal taxes:
tPA 
qEA
qQA
 qEA
qT
ÿ qEA
qQB

1 S
0
B
ÿD 0B

 QA ÿ YA 

1
ÿD 0B
 1
S 0B

; (14)
tCA  tPA 
qEA
qQA
. (15)
First, observe that both taxes will generally be nonzero. Next, note that equation (15)
could easily be solved for tCA alone by substitution of equation (14); the present
representation merely facilitates the interpretation. In particular, equation (15) shows
that the sum of tCA and tPA should be such that local deliveries are taxed according to
the standard Pigouvian rule based on the local valuation of marginal emissions from
local production. Hence, local production is regulated according to the `quasi-first-best'
tax rule, which only ignores the transboundary effects of local emissions.
Equation (14) shows the remaining net tax on exports. Apart from the same quasi-
first-best tax rule on marginal emissions from local production, three additional terms
appear. These reflect various second-best considerations that are relevant in the present
setting. The second term in equation (14), for instance, captures the local impact of
emissions from transport, and has the same quasi-first-best structure as the right-hand
side of equation (15). As one might suspect, these external costs are treated in exactly
the same manner as those from local production.
Next come two terms that both have a typical second-best structure. The numerator
represents a local welfare component affected by the production taxöthe marginal
local valuation of foreign emissions for the third term, and a terms-of-trade effect for
the fourth. These terms are multiplied by a weighting factor that may vary between 0
and 1 for the third term and between 0 and infinity for the fourth term. The weighting
factor represents the relative importance of these welfare components for the optimal
use of the tax, compared with the components that are directly affected by the tax
(local and transport emissions). Such second-best taxes have been discussed extensively
in the literature; Krutilla (1999), for instance, discusses production taxes and trade
tariffs. We therefore refrain from in-depth discussions of all tax expressions to be
derived in this paper. However, to demonstrate the sort of interpretation given to
such tax components, we will discuss the two final terms in equation (14) in some depth.
The third term in equation (14) is related to the local valuation, in region A, of
emissions from production in region B, and captures the marginal impact that local
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taxation of exports will have on emissions by foreign producers. A higher tax leads to
a comparative disadvantage of the local suppliers on the foreign market, and therefore
generally leads to an increase in foreign production for the foreign market, and hence
to increased emissions. The weighting factor, w  ÿ[1 (S 0B=ÿD 0B )]ÿ1, is nonpositive
and generally negative (D 0B denotes the slope of the demand curve in B and is non-
positive, S 0B gives the slope of the supply curve and is nonnegative), and may run from
0 to 1. This indicates that in the two limiting cases the local valuation of emissions
by foreign producers can be completely ignored (w  0), or (when w  1) should be
considered equally important, but opposite in sign, as the tax on emissions by local
producers and transport. It is instructive to consider these limiting cases somewhat
further; for intermediate cases where 0 < w < 1, the various processes to be indicated
below are traded off according to the expression for w.
First, w  0 can occur when the foreign demand is perfectly elastic in the second-
best optimum: D 0B  0. Local taxes in A cannot then affect the intraregional delivery
in B, owing to the insensitivity of the market price in region B. Second, w  0 can
occur when the foreign supply is perfectly inelastic: S 0B  1. Also then, the intrare-
gional delivery in B will not be affected by policies in A, because the foreign produc-
tion level is given. In either case, the policies in A will leave the local production in B
and its emissions unaffected, so that the potential interaction can be ignored com-
pletely in the second-best tax rule.
In contrast, w  1 occurs in the opposite cases where either foreign demand is
perfectly inelastic (D 0B  ÿ1), or its supply is perfectly elastic (S 0B  0) in the second-
best optimum. In both cases, on the market in B, every unit of good produced by A that
is `priced off the market' as a result of the regulation in A itself will be replaced by a unit
of good produced in B.With D 0B  ÿ1, this results directly from the inelasticity of the
demand. With S 0B  0, the market price in B cannot be influenced by region A, and
therefore neither can the total consumption in B. Recalling that intraregional deliveries
in region A itself are fine-tuned using equation (15), the result that, in cases where
w  1, the tax on exports should be corrected by fully subtracting the marginal external
costs caused by production in region B then follows directly. Owing to the complete
substitution, the `net' marginal external cost of production in A for the foreign market
is qEA=qQA  qEA=qTÿ qEA=qQB . Indeed, if production in B for the local market is
more polluting than production in A and transporting goods to B, the sum of the first
three terms in equation (14) becomes negative, showing that subsidization of exports is,
in such cases, beneficial from an environmental point of view.
The fourth and last term in equation (14) represents the so-called `terms-of-trade'
effect. Krutilla (1999) provides an in-depth discussion of this element in second-best
tax rules. In the present case, where A is a net exporter, this term represents the
revenues that can be extracted from the foreign market by taxing local production
for the purpose of driving up prices in region B. The numerator shows that the
advantage of doing so increases linearly with the exports to region B. The denominator
shows that if either the demand or the supply in the foreign market is perfectly elastic
(D 0B  0 or S 0B  0), this term vanishes in the second-best tax rule. In that case,
taxation for the purpose of affecting the terms of trade becomes useless; prices are
given in region B, and taxes would only distort the essentially efficient market process
in A (note that for the terms-of-trade effect per se, inefficiencies as a result of environ-
mental externalities do not play a role). The more inelastic the excess demand in region
B, the larger the `market power' enjoyed by the regulator in A, and hence the more
strongly he would be inclined to exploit this power.
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3.2.2 Region A is a net importer
In case II, equations (7a) and (12a) become irrelevant among the first-order conditions
[equations (6) ^ (13)]. By solving the remaining set of equations, the following second-best
optimal taxes are yielded:
tCA 
qEA
qT
 qEA
qQB

1 S
0
B
ÿD 0B

 YA ÿQA 

1
ÿD 0B
 1
S 0B

; (16)
tCA  tPA 
qEA
qQA
. (17)
Because equation (17) is identical to equation (15), intraregional deliveries in region A
are again taxed according to the `quasi-first-best' tax rule. The difference between this
and case I is that now the local consumption tax [equation (16)] is adapted to deal with
second-best aspects as a result of the openness of the economy. This is what one could
expect for a net importer.
The first term in equation (16) shows how the local valuation of emissions from
transport should, according to the quasi-first-best principle, enter the tax rule for
imports. The second term shows how the local valuation of emissions from foreign
production should be added to this. Apart from differing in signöbecause now a local
consumption tax instead of a production tax is used to influence emissions abroadö
this term is identical to the third term in equation (14). Finally, the third term again
represents the terms-of-trade effect. In this case, a higher tax on imports will have a
depressing effect on the market price in region B, and will improve region A's terms of
trade.
3.2.3 No trade
Finally, in the no-trade equilibrium, equations (7a), (7b), (12a), and (12b) become
irrelevant. The first-order conditions can then be solved to yield:
tCA  tPA 
qEA
qQA
. (18)
Local deliveries should be taxed according to the quasi-first-best Pigouvian principle.
Because no direct interactions exist between the two regions, other than environmental
spillovers, there is obviously no ground for adopting local tax policies for the purpose
of affecting emissions from transport or from production in the other region, or for the
purpose of improving the terms of trade.
3.3 Second-best taxes (II): optimizing regional welfare using production taxes only
The tax scheme presented in section 3.2 involves the joint use of two different taxes.
Under the assumption of noncooperation, this yields the optimal outcome for a region,
since taxes can be differentiated for the two commodity flows (intraregional deliveries
and interregional trade) that the region can directly affect. In practice, however, such a
scheme may be considered as too complicated, and regulators may rely on simpler
solutions, involving the use of one single tax only. We will therefore now present the
second-best tax rules for production taxes (this subsection) and consumption taxes
(section 3.4).
In order to find the second-best production taxes without interregional policy
coordination, the Lagrangian in equation (5) and the first-order conditions in equa-
tions (6) ^ (13) should be adapted by setting the term tCA equal to zero and removing
equation (9). The implied system of equations can then be solved for the three possible
trade regimes. Again, assuming that for both regions intraregional deliveries are
positive in all second-best optima, the tax rules given below can then be found:
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case Iöregion A is a net exporter,
tPA 
qEA
qQA
 qEA
qT

1
ÿD 0A
ÿD 0B
ÿD
0
A
S 0B
ÿ1 
ÿ qEA
qQB

1 S
0
B
ÿD 0B
 S
0
B
ÿD 0A

 QA ÿ YA 

1
ÿD 0A
 1ÿD 0B
 1
S 0B

; (19)
case IIöregion A is a net importer,
tPA 
qEA
qQA
ÿ qEA
qT

1
ÿD 0A
ÿD 0B
ÿD
0
A
S 0B
ÿ1 
ÿ qEA
qQB

1 S
0
B
ÿDB 0
 S
0
B
ÿD 0A

ÿ YA ÿQA 

1
ÿD 0A
 1ÿD 0B
 1
S 0B

; (20)
case IIIöno trade,
tPA 
qEA
qQA
. (21)
First of all, comparing equation (21) with equation (18) reveals that in a second-
best optimum without trade, the unavailability of the second taxöthe consumption tax
in this caseöcreates no additional constraints, and hence no additional welfare losses
compared with the case discussed in section 3.2. This is consistent with the redundancy
of one of the two taxes in equation (18). The interpretation of equation (21) is therefore
identical to that of equation (18).
Equations (19) and (20) show that in second-best equilibria with trade, however,
things will change when the consumption tax can no longer be used. Evidently, the
local welfare level achieved will normally be below, and never above, the level obtained
from the combinations of equations (14) and (15) for a net exporter, and equations (16)
and (17) for a net importer. This follows from the fact that the second-best optimal
consumption taxes [equations (15) and (16)] can always be set at zero.
The taxes in equations (19) and (20) are, after nullifying the transport and foreign
pollution components, consistent with tax rules (13) and (27.1) in Krutilla (1991) and
(1999), respectively. Note that equation (19) is in fact a `weighted average'of the tax rules
in equations (14) and (15), that also apply when a separate consumption tax is available.
One has to be careful with the term `weighted average', because it should, of course, not
be ignored that the terms involved in the optimal tax rules may differ for the respective
second-best equilibria, owing to the possible variability of the terms involved. Still, when
the local demand is perfectly inelastic (D 0A  ÿ1), equation (19) becomes identical to
equation (14), which is the net tax on exports when both taxes are available. In contrast,
when the local demand is perfectly elastic (D 0A  0), the last three terms vanish and
equation (19) becomes identical to equation (15), which is the net tax on intraregional
deliveries when both taxes are available. In that way, the two subgoals of regulating
intraregional deliveries and exports are traded off when only one tax is available, and
the relative weights given to these subgoals depend on the elasticity of the local demand.
The same reasoning actually holds for the tax rule in equation (20), which is
applied, for case II, where region A is a net importer. This can be verified by substitut-
ing equation (16) into equation (17). It then also follows immediately that when the
local demand is perfectly inelastic (D 0A  ÿ1), equation (20) becomes identical to tPA
[implied by equations (16) and (17)], and when the local demand is perfectly inelastic
(D 0A  0), equation (20) becomes identical to the net tax on intranodal deliveries
[equation (17)].
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3.4 Second-best taxes (III): optimizing regional welfare using consumption taxes only
Finally, in order to find the second-best consumption tax without interregional policy
coordination, the Lagrangian equation (5) and the first-order conditions given in equa-
tions (6) ^ (13) should be adapted by setting tPA equal to zero and by removing equation
(10). The implied system of equations can again be solved for the three possible trade
regimes. Maintaining the assumption that for both regions, intraregional deliveries
are positive in all second-best optima, the following tax rules can then be found:
Case Iöregion A is a net exporter
tCA 
qEA
qQA

1 S
0
A
ÿD 0B
 S
0
A
S 0B

ÿ qEA
qT

1

S 0A
ÿD 0B
 S
0
A
S 0B
ÿ1 
 qEA
qQB

1 S
0
B
ÿD 0B
 S
0
B
S 0A

ÿ QA ÿ YA 

1
ÿD 0B
 1
S 0A
 1
S 0B

; (22)
Case IIöregion A is a net importer
tCA 
qEA
qQA

1 S
0
A
ÿD 0B
 S
0
A
S 0B

 qEA
qT

1

S 0A
ÿD 0B
 S
0
A
S 0B
ÿ1 
 qEA
qQB

1 S
0
B
ÿD 0B
 S
0
B
S 0A

 YA ÿQA 

1
ÿD 0B
 1
S 0A
 1
S 0B

; (23)
Case IIIöno trade
tCA 
qEA
qQA
. (24)
The interpretation of equations (22) ^ (24) can be given along the same lines as that of
equations (19) ^ (21). Now the important additional factor, compared with the case where
both taxes are available, is the sensitivity of local supply in the second-best optimum,
reflected by the slope of the supply curve S 0A. With perfectly inelastic local supply
(S 0A  1), equation (22) becomes identical to the expression for tCA according to equa-
tions (14) and (15), and equation (23) becomes identical to equation (16); with perfectly
elastic supply (S 0A  0), both equations (22) and (23) become identical to equations (15)
and (17). Finally, it is again found that in a no-trade second-best equi-librium, local
deliveries should be taxed according to the quasi-first-best rule of equation (24).
3.5 One tax only: production tax or consumption tax?
The final question we want to address in this section concerns the question of which of
the two above taxesöproduction or consumptionöwould be preferable in a case
where the regulator is, for whatever reason, restricted to making this choice. Evidently,
if regulation were costless, it is always preferable to use both; as argued above, one of
the two can always be set at a zero level, and higher levels of regional welfare generally
result when equations (14) and (15), or (16) and (17), are applied simultaneously.
However, when, for instance, administrative costs are considered (which are not
modeled explicitly here) the situation may become different and, especially when raising
an additional tax involves some fixed costs, it may be preferable to use only one tax.
In such cases, this question becomes relevant.
A general answer to this question does not exist. That is, it is not the case that
either production taxes or consumption taxes by definition always allow the regulator
to obtain a higher level of regional welfare than would be achievable with the other tax.
In general, however, the tendency will be that net exporters prefer to use production
taxes, and net importers prefer consumption taxes. The intuition is that they can then
directly affect a larger share of the total production in the entire system. Moreover, the
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various subgoals reflected in the second-best tax rules then require, at least to a larger
degree, equally signed tax terms. For a net importer, this is evident because equa-
tion (23) consists of four positive terms, whereas equation (20) has one positive term
and three negative ones. For a net exporter, the difference is somewhat more subtle:
equation (19) has three positive terms and one negative one, and equation (22) two
positive terms and two negative ones. In general, different signs in a second-best tax rule
indicate counteracting forces in the determination of the second-best optimal tax ruleö
the various subgoals require opposite incentives. The more this can be avoided, the more
efficiently the tax can be used. In the extreme case, where the various subgoals would
exactly cancel and sum up to a second-best tax equal to zero, the instrument is entirely
ineffective and inefficient. The best strategy, then, is not to use the tax at all, since any
value different from zeroöbe it positive or negativeöimplies a lower welfare level than
that obtained when the tax is not used and is set equal to zero.
Along this same line of reasoning, it is also possible to demonstrate that it is not
generally true that a net exporter would prefer production taxes, and a net importer
consumption taxes. To do so, it is sufficient to construct a counterexample in terms of
a set of parameter values, for which the second-best production tax for the net exporter
would be equal to zero whereas the second-best consumption tax would not, and
conversely, the second-best consumption tax for the net importer would be equal to
zero whereas the second-best production tax would not.
For the net exporter, this would, for instance, be the case when equation (19) is
equal to zero whereas equation (22) is notöfor instance, if the net exporter's local
demand is perfectly elastic (D 0A  0), and the local producers do not emit any local
externalities (qEA=qQA  0). The production tax then is indeed an entirely inefficient
instrument. Because of the perfectly elastic local demand, the after-production-tax
producers' price in the exporting region cannot be affected by the production tax.
This also implies that the trade and transport flow cannot be affected. Hence, the
only delivery that can be affected is the local intraregional delivery. However, because
local production causes no local externalities at all, it is actually welfare reducing to
affect this intraregional delivery. In particular, any deviation from the market outcome
with a zero production tax would imply a welfare deterioration, because a production
tax would drive a (welfare-reducing) wedge between regional marginal benefits and
regional marginal costs of local deliveries. Since equation (22) is certainly not necessarily
equal to zero when D 0A  0 and qEA=qQA  0, it follows that a local consumption tax
may yield regional welfare improvements, and hence would be preferable to a local
production tax under the described circumstances.
Likewise, one can construct a comparable situation where, for a net importer, the
tax rule in equation (23) would produce a second-best optimal consumption tax equal
to zero, implying no possible welfare gain whatsoever, whereas the second-best pro-
duction tax rule in equation (20) would be unequal to zero, indicating that welfare
improvements can be achieved. This would involve the situation where the net impor-
ter's local supply is perfectly elastic (S 0A  0), and the local producers do not emit any
local externalities (qEA=qQA  0). A consumption tax would then be unable to affect
the (after-tax) producers' price, implying that the trade and transport volume is given.
The same sort of reasoning as given above therefore again applies that only the intra-
regional deliveryönot the trade and transport volumeöcan be affected. However, this
delivery is optimized already under unregulated free-market conditions.
We therefore conclude that if, for whatever reason, a regulator is restricted to using
only one tax instrument, the tendency will be that net exporters prefer to use production
taxes, and net importers to use consumption taxes. However, counterexamples where the
opposite case holds can easily be constructed, and hence this inference is not generally true.
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4 The overall system effects of second-best policies
If the two regions cooperate, they would, of course, be best off applying the best tax
scheme given in equations (4a) ^ (4d). Provided that the regions also negotiate on the
distribution of the tax revenues, compensation schemes, by definition, must exist that
also maximize the individual regional welfare levels. Therefore, both from an overall
system's perspective and from the regional perspective, such a tax scheme could be
welfare maximizing. On the other hand, the schemes discussed in sections 3.2 ^ 3.4
describe situations where regions, under various restrictions, aim to maximize only
regional welfare, taking taxes in the other region as given. The question then is how
these policies compare, from the overall system's perspective, to the two benchmarks
one could distinguish, namely the nonintervention outcome and the first-best situation.
In other words, the question is what implicit price is paid for the failure of the two
governments to cooperate in formulating joint welfare-maximizing policies.
Based on the general specifications used in this paper, no conclusive answers can be
given to this question, since comparative static analyses can be performed only after an
explicit model has been specified. This would have the obvious disadvantage that the
level of generality is brought down considerably. However, based on the tax rules
presented in section 3, some first inferences can still be made. For that purpose, it can,
in the first place, be noted that, even if we restrict ourselves to equilibria with trade,
no fewer than seventeen relevant regimes can be considered: the optimal one presented
in section 3.1; and the 464 regimes where both regions can employ no tax at all, both
second-best taxes as in section 3.2, a production tax as in section 3.3, or a consumption
tax as in section 3.4. Another five additional cases become relevant when we also consider
equilibria without trade: optimal taxes; and four noncoordinated tax regimes, where both
regions can choose whether or not to apply the second-best noncoordinated tax.
Among the resulting twenty-two possible schemes, we limit ourselves in the first
place only to equilibria with trade. Table A1 (in the appendix) shows the possible taxes
that both regions (the net exporter, E, and the net importer, I) can apply. The tax rules
shown in table A1 follow directly from those derived in section 3. The table shows the
marginal effect of a tax on the three types of delivery (intraregional deliveries within
both regions, and the unidirectional interregional trade flow), and thus enables one to
assess the marginal tax rates in each of the seventeen regimes with trade that would
apply for each of these deliveries (rows representing `zero-taxes' are left out of the
table). Note that for the determination of the marginal tax on the interregional deliv-
ery, one should sum two expressions (from the two columns) because both regions will
normally tax (or subsidize) this delivery.
Next, we limit ourselves further by considering only four tax regimes among these
seventeen. These are, in the first place, the two benchmarks, whether either the optimal
taxes or no taxes at all apply. We concentrate, however, on two second-best regimes,
namely the case where both regions apply both taxes, and the case where the net exporter
uses a production tax and the net importer a consumption tax. By using table A1, one
can then derive the marginal tax rates for each of the three deliveriesöZEE , ZII , and
ZEI öin each of the three regimes with taxes. These are presented in table A2. Therefore,
the tax rates shown in table A2 indicate the differences between these three tax regimes,
and the situation with no taxes at all.
For the interpretation of the second-best tax rules, in particular, it is tempting to
compare these rules directly with those that apply in the first-best situation. It is
important to emphasize, however, that this exercise has only a limited comparative
static relevance, because many of the terms involved in the various tax rules may vary
between equilibria (for instance, the optimum compared to one of the second-best
equilibria). Therefore, differences between the expressions in table A1 and table A2
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(that are shown in table A3) would straightforwardly give the difference in actual
equilibrium tax rates only if all terms involved were constants. Although this could
still be true for the various marginal external costs and the slopes of the relevant supply
and demand curves, it is hard to see how this could be the case for the trade balance, T.
Consequently, the expressions presented in tables A1 and A2 should be compared
only with sufficient care, and differences should be interpreted only as listings of
relevant terms lacking from (or `falsely' included in) the second-best marginal tax rules,
compared with optimal rules.
Now, if we first consider the regime with both taxes (regime BB), and focus on
taxes on both intraregional deliveries, it appears that the relevant expressions suggest
tax rates between those applying in the no-tax situation, and best taxes. Although the
cross-effects in the optimal taxes, accounting for spatial externality spillovers, are lacking,
the remaining terms still indicate positive taxes. For the tax on intraregional deliveries,
however, things are more complex. The resulting rule may imply a negative tax (when
all externalities except qEE=qQi are zero and S
0
E  S 0I  0), may take on a nonnegative
value below the optimal level, or may suggest a tax exceeding the first-best tax (for
instance when environmental externalities are absent or negligible). As long as the tax
rule suggests a positive tax below the optimal level, one would therefore expect the non-
cooperative equilibrium, where both regions apply both taxes, to result in a below-optimal
welfare level, but still an improvement compared with the situation where no taxes at all
apply. However, if the intraregional delivery is relatively important, and if the relevant
parameters dictate an overall tax on this delivery that is either negative or exceeds the
optimal rule, it could in theory be possible that the total welfare in the system even falls
below the level with no taxes. Hence, a general conclusion is not possible.
If we next look at the marginal tax rules applying in the situation where the net
exporter uses production taxes and the net importer consumption taxes (regime PC), it
can be noted that the variability increases compared with the situation where both
regions apply both taxes. The tax on the intraregional delivery in the exporting region
may become negative, may be positive but below the tax in regime BB, may be between
the tax in regime BB and the optimal tax, or may exceed the optimal tax. The tax
on the intraregional delivery in the importing region, although strictly nonnegative,
may be below the tax in region BB or may exceed it, and could also exceed the optimal
tax. Finally, if we compare the tax on the interregional delivery in regimes PC and BB,
it can be seen that the former contains one extra positive term, but that the denomi-
nators in the subsequent terms are usually larger. Again, therefore, no general conclusion
on the relative size of this tax, compared with other regimes, can be given.
Clearly, if we do not consider a full equilibrium model, and compare the marginal
tax rules in the various regimes, no general conclusion on the relative performance of
the two second-best regimes can be given. The question of how the BB and PC regimes
compare with each other is an open one. However, it can be noted that for most
parameter combinations, one would expect a welfare level exceeding the level resulting
in the no-tax regime for both the BB and the PC regimes. Nevertheless, given the
relative complexity of the various tax rules, and given the neglect of the endogeneity
of the relevant terms present in these rules, it seems worthwhile to consider these
questions further by using a numerical simulation model.
5 Conclusion
The international and spatial dimension of environmental pollution and environmental
policymaking has recently received ample attention in international negotiations on
environmental protection, as well as in the environmental economics literature. In
this paper, we presented an analytical framework for analysing spatial aspects of
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environmental policies in the regulation of transboundary externalities. A spatial price
equilibrium model for two regions was discussed, where interactions between the regions
can occur via trade and transport, via mutual environmental spillovers owing to the
externality that arises form production, and via uncoordinated taxes when the regions do
not behave cooperatively. Also, the additional complications arising from emissions
caused by the endogenous transport flows are considered explicitly in the model
presented. The first-best and second-best tax rules were derived and interpreted. The
first-best, here, refers to the situation where both regions coordinate their policies
optimally so as to maximize their joint welfare, whereas second-best taxes apply in
those situations where policy coordination is lacking and regions aim to maximize only
their own welfare.
The analyses showed that, whereas first-best taxes still take on the standard
Pigouvian form, second-best tax expressions can become quite complex, even in the
relatively simple setting chosen. The general forms clearly reflect the various subgoals
that a region has to trade off in the maximization of the local welfare. Because local
consumers and producers are price-takers and therefore maximize the consumers'
and producers' surpluses through their market behavior, the remaining subgoals for
a regulator to consider are: the local valuation of emissions by local producers, by
transport, and by foreign producers; and the region's terms of trade. These goals are
then traded-off in different manners in the various second-best tax rules discussed,
depending of course on how the tax intervenes in the economic process. Generally, the
tax rules are weighted averages of terms reflecting the four subgoals mentioned, where
the weights are made up of terms related to the elasticities of the various relevant
demand and supply functions.
The analyses reveal that general conclusions are elusive. For instance, if a region
can apply only one tax, then a net exporter will generally prefer a production tax and a
net importer a consumption tax, but counterexamples can be given where the opposite
holds. Furthermore, uncoordinated second-best policies need not always lead to a
welfare improvement compared to the nonintervention situation. Moreover, when
comparing two relatively likely second-best tax configurationsönamely one where
both regions use both taxes, and one where the net exporter uses a production tax
and the net importer a consumption taxöit appeared that from an overall system's
perspective, no general welfare ranking can be given. It was shown, however, that from
the perspective of a single region, the use of both taxes is strictly preferable when there
are no administrative costs of regulation.
Notwithstanding the ambiguities, these findings are, of course, valuable as they
demonstrate the complexity of the issues at hand. Moreover, the various tax rules
presented are generally valid, and enhance our insight into the broad problems studied.
These tax rules, as well as the general modeling framework, will prove to be useful in
further research into this important area. We intend to address two important exten-
sions of the present analyses in the near future, including the construction of a
numerical simulation model in which the full equilibrium effectsöas opposed to
marginal tax rulesöof first-best and various second-best regulatory schemes can be
investigated, and the consideration of endogenous environmental technologies in the
present framework.
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Table A1. Second-best tax rules for net exporters (region E) and net importers (region I).
Delivery Net exporter
Optimum
ZEE
qEE
qQE
ZII
qEE
qQI
ZEI
qEE
qQE
 qEE
qT
Noncoordination
Both taxes
ZEE
qEE
qQE
ZII 0
ZEI
qEE
qQE
 qEE
qT
ÿ qEE
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0I

T

1
ÿD 0I
 1
S 0I

Production taxes
ZEE
qEE
qQE
 qEE
qT

1
ÿD 0E
ÿD 0I
ÿD
0
E
S 0I
ÿ1 
ÿ qEE
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0I
 S
0
I
ÿD 0E

T

1
ÿD 0E
 1ÿD 0I
 1
S 0I

ZII 0
ZEI
qEE
qQE
 qEE
qT

1
ÿD 0E
ÿD 0I
ÿD
0
E
S 0I
ÿ1 
ÿ qEE
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0I
 S
0
I
ÿD 0E

T

1
ÿD 0E
 1ÿD 0I
 1
S 0I

Consumption taxes
ZEE
qEE
qQE

1 S
0
E
ÿD 0I
 S
0
E
S 0I

ÿ qEE
qT

1

S 0E
ÿD 0I
 S
0
E
S 0I
ÿ1 
 qEE
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0I
 S
0
I
S 0E

ÿT

1
ÿD 0I
 1
S 0E
 1
S 0I

ZII 0
ZEI 0
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Table A1 (continued).
Net importer
qEI
qQE
qEI
qQI
qEI
qQE
 qEI
qT
0
qEI
qQI
qEI
qT
 qEI
qQE

1 S
0
E
ÿD 0E

T

1
ÿD 0E
 1
S 0E

0
qEI
qQI
ÿ qEI
qT

1
 ÿD 0I
ÿD 0E
ÿD
0
I
S 0E
ÿ1 
ÿ qEI
qQE

1 S
0
E
ÿD 0E
 S
0
E
ÿD 0I

ÿT

1
ÿD 0I
 1ÿD 0E
 1
S 0E

0
0
qEI
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0E
 S
0
I
S 0E

 qEI
qT

1

S 0I
ÿD 0E
 S
0
I
S 0E
ÿ1 
 qEI
qQE

1 S
0
E
ÿD 0E
 S
0
E
S 0I

T

1
ÿD 0E
 1
S 0I
 1
S 0E

qEI
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0E
 S
0
I
S 0E

 qEI
qT

1

S 0I
ÿD 0E
 S
0
I
S 0E
ÿ1 
 qEI
qQE

1 S
0
E
ÿD 0E
 S
0
E
S 0I

T

1
ÿD 0E
 1
S 0I
 1
S 0E

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Table A2. Marginal tax rates in three regimes.
Delivery Tax rates
Optimum
ZEE
qEE
qQE
 qEI
qQE
ZII
qEE
qQI
 qEI
qQI
ZEI
qEE
qQE
 qEE
qT
 qEI
qQE
 qEI
qT
Both regions use both taxes (BB)
ZEE
qEE
qQE
ZII
qEI
qQI
ZEI
qEE
qQE
 qEE
qT
ÿ qEE
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0I

T

1
ÿD 0I
 1
S 0I

 qEI
qT
 qEI
qQE

1 S
0
E
ÿD 0E

 T

1
ÿD 0E
 1
S 0E

Net exporter uses production taxes and net importer uses consumption taxes (PC)
ZEE
qEE
qQE
 qEE
qT

1
ÿD 0E
ÿD 0I
ÿD
0
E
S 0I
ÿ1 
ÿ qEE
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0I
 S
0
I
ÿD 0E

T

1
ÿD 0E
 1ÿD 0I
 1
S 0I

ZII
qEI
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0E
 S
0
I
S 0E

 qEI
qT

1

S 0I
ÿD 0E
 S
0
I
S 0E
ÿ1 
 qEI
qQE

1 S
0
E
ÿD 0E
 S
0
E
S 0I

T

1
ÿD 0E
 1
S 0I
 1
S 0E

ZEI
qEE
qQE
 qEE
qT

1
ÿD 0E
ÿD 0I
ÿD
0
E
S 0I
ÿ1 
ÿ qEE
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0I
 S
0
I
ÿD 0E

T

1
ÿD 0E
 1ÿD 0I
 1
S 0I

 qEI
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0E
 S
0
I
S 0E

 qEI
qT

1

S 0I
ÿD 0E
 S
0
I
S 0E
ÿ1 
 qEI
qQE

1 S
0
E
ÿD 0E
 S
0
E
S 0I

T

1
ÿD 0E
 1
S 0I
 1
S 0E

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Table A3. Differences in tax rules.
Delivery Optimum minus second-best tax rules
Both regions use both taxes
ZEE
qEI
qQE
ZII
qEE
qQI
ZEI
qEE
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0I

 qEI
qQE
ÿ qEI
qQE

1 S
0
E
ÿD 0E

ÿ T

1
ÿD 0E
 1
S 0E

ÿ T

1
ÿD 0I
 1
S 0I

Net exporter uses production taxes and net importer uses consumption taxes
ZEE
qEE
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0I
 S
0
I
ÿD 0E

ÿqEE
qT

1
ÿD 0E
ÿD 0I
ÿD
0
E
S 0I
ÿ1 
 qEI
qQE
ÿ T

1
ÿD 0E
 1ÿD 0I
 1
S 0I

ZII
qEE
qQI
 qEI
qQI
ÿ qEI
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0E
 S
0
I
S 0E

ÿ qEI
qQE

1 S
0
E
ÿD 0E
 S
0
E
S 0I

ÿ qEI
qT

1

S 0I
ÿD 0E
 S
0
I
S 0E
ÿ1 
ÿT

1
ÿD 0E
 1
S 0I
 1
S 0E

ZEI
qEE
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0E
 S
0
I
ÿD 0I

 qEE
qT
ÿ qEE
qT

1
ÿD 0E
ÿD 0I
ÿD
0
E
S 0I
ÿ1 
ÿ qEI
qQI

1 S
0
I
ÿD 0E
 S
0
I
S 0E

 qEI
qQE
ÿ qEI
qQE

1 S
0
E
ÿD 0E
 S
0
E
S 0I

 qEI
qT
ÿ qEI
qT

1

S 0I
ÿD 0E
 S
0
I
S 0E
ÿ1 
ÿ T

1
ÿD 0E
 1
S 0E
 1
S 0I

ÿ T

1
ÿD 0E
 1
D 0I
 1
S 0I

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